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COPYRIGHT AND "THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT"
OF AUTHORS
L. Ray Patterson*
The Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
The origin and progress of laws, securing to
authors the exclusive rightofpublishing and vending
their literary works, constitutes an article in the
history of a country of no inconsiderable importance.
NOAH WEBSTER, POLITICAL, LITERARY, AND MORAL SUBJECTS 173

(1843) (emphasis added).
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'THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT
I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to define and explore the meaning of
"the exclusive Right" in the Intellectual Property Clause of the
United States Constitution as related to the promotion of learning,
the public domain, and authors.1 Without a clear understanding
of this key term, one is likely to be unaware that lower federal
courts are continually making rulings contrary to both the Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act. The classic example is the
judicially created sweat-of-the-brow copyright, which in 1991-after
seventy-five years of precedent-the Supreme Court decreed to be
Other bad precedents, such as perpetual
unconstitutional.'
injunctions to prevent the infringement of future copyrights,3
remain uncorrected.
Part of the reason for this state of affairs is that "the exclusive
Right" has received little attention, perhaps because there is no
question as to its 1787 meaning: the right of authors to publish
and vend their writings.4 The 1787 meaning of the phrase,
however, is not the determinative point. As the right to vend
indicates, the purpose of "the exclusive Right" was surely to

1U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Intellectual Property Clause contains the Patent as
well as the Copyright Clause. The differences between the two Clauses become clear when
the entire Clause is read distributively. I deal only with the Copyright Clause.
'See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding white pages
of phone directories uncopyrightable and invalidating the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine).
' Permanent injunctions to protect works not yet created are judicial copyrights in the
tradition of the sweat-of-the-brow copyrights, granted without any regard for either
constitutional restraints or statutory requirements. See, e.g., Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572
F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (holding videotaping of news broadcasts for sale to subjects
of news reports does not constitute fair use), affd in part and rev'd in part, 744 F.2d 1490
(11th Cir. 1984), on remand, 618 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga.), aftd, 792 F.2d 113 (11th Cir.
1985).
" The conclusion is supported by abundant evidence from the time of the origin of
copyright in Tudor England up until the 1976 Act, when Congress ostensibly ignored the
constitutional limitations on its power by giving copyright owners five rights: the
reproduction right, the adaptation right, and the public distribution, public performance, and
public display rights. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
While the phrase "publish and vend" has tautological possibilities in that to publish can
be defined as the right to print for sale, to publish is more precisely defined as to distribute
a work to the public, which the author may do without vending it. The right to publish and
vend thus defines the author's right to distribute copies of the work to the public or not, and
if he or she chooses to do so, to charge for the copies.
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empower Congress to grant the author a right to gain a profit from
his or her writings. Congress, then, can properly treat the
Copyright Clause as giving it the power to grant copyright protection accordingly.
Such a purpose, however, does not conclude the matter because
the Copyright Clause is specifically a limitation on, as well as a
grant of, Congress's power. The limitations are manifest in three
basic policies expressed in the Copyright Clause: the promotion of
learning, because the language so states; the protection of the
public domain, because Congress can grant copyright only for a
limited time (and only for new writings); and the benefit for the
author, who is the person entitled to copyright.' The policies are
not wholly consistent-protection of the public domain necessarily
limits the benefit to the author-and the careful phrasing of the
Copyright Clause to include them all indicates a specific purpose:
protection against the misuse of copyright. A misuse would occur,
for example, if a copyright owner used copyright to inhibit rather
than promote learning, which copyright history has revealed to be
a real danger.'
The limiting policies, then, comprise the determinative point in
defining Congress's power to grant copyright. However broadly
Congress extends the copyright monopoly, that extension cannot
lawfully negate the constitutional policies of copyright. As John
Marshall wrote, "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the
constitution is written."'
As I shall demonstrate below, Congress has for the most part
adhered to the constitutional policies of copyright in enacting
copyright statutes, but many lower federal courts have not felt
themselves bound by those same policies in interpreting the
statutes. The important question is why? The reason relates to
misunderstandings as to the source of copyright. Is that source the

"For a detailed discussion of the limitations manifest in the three policies, see generally

L, RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USER
RIGHTS (1992).
'See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, 737 F. Supp. 610 (D. Kan. 1990), rev'd,
Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding telephone directory
white pages uncopyrightable).
' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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common law as promulgated by judges, or is it the positive law
enacted by a legislature? To state the issue another way: Is
copyright an author's natural-law property right or merely the
grant of a limited statutory monopoly?"
Disagreement as to the source of "the exclusive Right" generates
confusion. With the expansion of copyright to protect means of
communication other than the printed word, this confusion has
become increasingly influential, for it is a fertile source of arguments for enhancing the copyright monopoly." The subtlety of the
dispute is that the issue appears to be only about the source of
copyright, but in fact it is about the nature of copyright and
therefore about the scope of its protection. If the source of
copyright is a natural-law right of the author, the argument that
the protection is plenary follows logically; if the source is statutory
law, the protection is necessarily limited by the terms of the
statute.
There is, however, no reason for confusion as to either the source
or the nature of copyright. The authoritative pronouncements that
copyright is the grant of a limited statutory monopoly are too many
and too clear. Other reasons, then, must be sought. A major
reason is that copyright owners resisted statutory limitations from
the start and by their strong advocacy of the natural-law rationalization sought to (and did) change the issue from a legal question
a This question--originally at least-was unrelated to the meaning of "the exclusive
Right" as used in the Copyright Clause. Proponents of both the natural-law theory and the
statutory-grant theory agreed that copyright was only the right to publish and vend,
presumably because there was then no other way an author could profit from his or her

writings. See generally Howard B. Abrams, The HistoricFoundationsofAmerican Copyright
Law: Exploding the Myth of American Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119 (1983)
(arguing that historic foundation of copyright law rests on misreading of history and
precedent); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Propertyin Revolutionary
France,64 TUL L REV. 991 (1990) (distinguishing natural-law theory used in revolutionary

France and statutory-grant theory used in the United States); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech,
Copyright, and FairUse, 40 VAND. L REV. 1, 28-33 (1987) (discussing distinction between
ownership of work and ownership of copyright).
' The stationers' copyright created no issue as to the nature of copyright, for it was
created and controlled by members of the Stationers' Company. But its successor, the
statutory copyright of the Statute of Anne, was a limited right. It was in opposition to the
statutory-grant theory that the natural.law theory was promoted as a plenary property right.
See EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS

22-23 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1879) reprinted by The Legal Classics Library (1987)
(examining copyright law during nineteenth century).
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into a political question.
The difference between a legal and a political question is that the
former can always be answered with integrity in terms of reason
and logic; the latter can be resolved only by compromise dictated by
self-interest. 0 The significance of the source of copyright as a
political question, however, is not the answer it may provide but
the ambiguity it generates. That ambiguity gives courts-who
inevitably view the political question as a legal one-the leeway to
ignore constitutional policies of copyright.
Much can be learned, for example, by looking at the free-speech
values contained in the Copyright Clause," which courts have
consistently ignored. The reason, it seems, is that courts view
copyright as property derived from the author's natural-law right
even if by way of statute. Under this view, the Copyright Clause
empowers Congress to grant a private lawmaking power to
copyright owners to enable them to protect their private property.
Consequently, the government bears no responsibility if owners use
their "property" as a device of private censorship.
Copyright for new communications technology has enhanced
copyright's intrusion into the free-speech arena because it has made
the monopoly available for the performance-in addition to the
publication-of information. The cross-pollination effect of the
extension of copyright protection from a product, e.g., a book, to a
process, e.g., live television broadcasts, means an expansion of the
monopoly for the old as well as the new communications technolo2
gy, which enhances the danger of private censorship severalfold.1
'o When presented with copyright issues, courts inevitably resolve them in terms of how
they perceive the self-interest of the parties. Since courts perceive copyright as property-always a matter of self-interest to the property holder--the majority of copyright
decisions probably favor copyright owners.
" The free-speech values are made manifest by the fact that copyright exists to promote
learning (which requires accessibility to the material to be learned), exists only for limited
times (thereby protecting the public domain), and is available only to authors and only for
their writings (which provides additional protection for the public domain and access to
learning materials).
1 Courts tend to grant greater protection to the products of new technology rather than
old because their rulings in regard to new technology are not bound by precedent. Thus,
lower courts tend to limit severely the right to copy a computer program. See Whelan Assoc.
v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (giving copyright protection to "look
and feel" of such programs), affd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031
(1987); cf. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Minn. 1985)
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This threat to the constitutional policy that copyright promote
learning means that a central problem in contemporary copyright
law is how to continue the protection afforded to the public by
constitutional policies while providing needed legal protection for
providers of the services. The framers used the right to publish
and vend as the measure of those policies, and this limited grant
made by Congress led to the development of copyright principles to
implement those policies. Among the most important of those
principles are: (1) the limited-grant principle, (2) the separation
principle, (3) the primary-market principle, and (4) the accessibility
principle.
My thesis is that these principles continue to be the means for
preserving and implementing the constitutional policies of copyright. So long as courts apply them, Congress's extension of
copyright in response to the political exigencies of modem communication technology can be kept within the limits of its constitutional power.' 3 As I shall demonstrate below, these principles are
codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, but this fact does not become
apparent until the rules of that statute are interpreted in light of
the Copyright Clause.
Part II of this article deals with the source of "the exclusive
Right" that the framers empowered Congress to secure, which

(giving copyright protection to page numbers of non-copyrightable works (court opinions) in
published form to prevent their use in computer databases), affd, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). Once the copyright owner's right to copy computer
programs, for example, is enhanced, it is relatively easy for copyright owners to get courts
to extend this enhancement to printed material, the traditional form of copyrighted works.

See Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (giving
copyright protection in spite of fair-use arguments to excerpts of text in college photocopied
and bound course packets). This is the cross-pollination effect.
The adherence of the United States to the Berne Convention makes an appreciation

of this point more important than ever. The merger of the economic based statutory-grantof-monopoly theory of American copyright with the author's natural-law-proprietary-right
theory of the Berne Convention provides a basis for overriding the policies in order to

enhance the monopoly of copyright and make it consistent with member countries of Berne,
countries whose legislatures are not limited in power by the Copyright Clause of the United
States Constitution and in which free speech is not as high in the pantheon of values as in
the United States. The scope of copyright protection that the Berne theory of copyright
apparently justifies thus demonstrates the wisdom of the framers in limiting the power of
Congress to grant copyright and the folly of disregarding the constitutional policies to which

American copyright is subject.
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requires a brief consideration of the history of English copyright
jurisprudence as well as the American understanding of that
jurisprudence. Part III shows that copyright policies and principles
are derived from the meaning of "the exclusive Right" as the right
to publish and vend; and Part IV demonstrates that the 1976 Act
codifies the principles discussed in light of "the exclusive Right."
Part V is a brief commentary on understanding copyright, a goal
that requires courts to cease reading the Copyright Act piecemeal
and to read it whole in light of the Copyright Clause. Part VI is
the conclusion.
II. THE SOURCE OF "THE EXCLUSVE RIGHT"
The source of "the exclusive Right" is not subject to reasonable
doubt. It is a legislative body. Anglo-American copyright has
always been statutory, although in England the first copyright acts
(other than the printing patents granted under the sovereign's
prerogative) were ordinances of the London Company of the
booktrade, the Stationers' Company, and were, in effect, private
statutes. 14 In this country, the legislature has always been the
source of copyright. Thus, twelve of the thirteen states enacted
copyright statutes during the period of the Confederation; 5 and
the ultimate legislative body was the Constitutional Convention of
1787, which delegated (to Congress the power to secure to the
author a copyright for his or her writings. Even though they used
the word "secure," if the framers intended to empower Congress to
grant authors a natural-law right, they acted inconsistently. 6 A
14 See generally L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968)
(detailing treatment of stationers' copyright).
15The state statutes are reprinted in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE BULLETIN No. 3, COPYRIGHT
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1783-1962, at 1-19 (1962) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT
OFFICE BULLETIN No. 31. Delaware was the state that did not enact a copyright statute.
Note that the so-called common-law copyright, a judicial creation, was not a copyright, but
the right of first publication.
"'Counsel in the Supreme Court's first copyright decision argued that the author had at
common law a perpetual property in the copy of his works. Using Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng.
Rep. 201 (KB. 1769), to sustain his position, counsel asserted that Justice Willes, Justice
Aston, and Lord Mansfield all "agreed, not only that an author had a property at common
law, but that it was perpetual, notwithstanding the Statute of Anne." Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 596 (1834). He sought to buttress his position with the language in the
Copyright Clause. The Court, of course, rejected the argument with its holding that

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss1/5
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natural-law right would be secured in perpetuity, but Congress is
empowered to secure "the exclusive Right" that is copyright only for
a limited time, a limitation consistent with the historical sources
of American copyright law, events in seventeenth and eighteenth
century England.
A. THE ENGLISH HERITAGE

The event in the history of Anglo-American copyright that led to
the shaping events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was
the Charter of the Stationers' Company granted in 1556 by Philip
and Mary, the Roman Catholic successors to Henry VIII's Protestant son, Edward VI. The Charter gave the stationers the power
to make "ordinances, provisions, and statutes" for the governance
of "the art or mistery of [s]tationery," as well as the power to search
out illegal presses and books and things with the power of "seizing,
taking, or burning the foresaid books or things, or any of them
printed or to be printed
contrary to the form of any statute, act, or
17
proclamation .....
The power to burn offending books was a benefit to the sovereign
(a weapon against unlawful publications), and a boon to the
stationers (a weapon against competition). The book-burning power
thus shows the real motivation for the Charter, to secure the
allegiance of the stationers as policemen of the press for the
sovereign in an uncertain world. The stationers, however, insisted
on a quid pro quo. They were interested in governmental censorship only because it gave them the power of private censorship to
control competition, and their allegiance shifted as the world
changed. Thus, William Crosskey points out that Philip and Mary
incorporated the Stationers' Company "to set up a mode of regulating the English printing trade that would facilitate the efforts of

copyright is the grant of a limited statutory monopoly. ('The delegation is to secure
exclusive rights-not to grant property or confirm property, or grant rights or confirm or
establish rights, but to secure rights." Id. at 600.)
" The Charter of the Company of Stationers of London, reprinted in 1 EDWARD ARBER,
A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF LONDON, 1554-1640
A.D. xxviii-xxxii (Peter Smith ed., 1950) (1875). The Charter was renewed by Elizabeth I on
November 10, 1559. 1 id. at xxxii.
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the Romish clergy to stamp out the Protestant Reformation." 8
But the motives of the stationers "were of a less exalted kind.""
Thus, Elizabeth, relying on the stationers' self-interest, confirmed
the Charter to turn the stationers to support the English, rather
than the Romish, church, and the Stationers' Company became,
in turn, the instrument of the Stuarts against the
Puritans, in the early seventeenth century; the
instrument of the Puritans, against their royalist
enemies, when the Puritans came to power; the
instrument of the royalists against the Puritans,
after the Restoration; and, for a brief time, the
instrument of the triumphant Whigs, after "the
glorious Revolution," of 1688. But through all these
vicissitudes, the stationers themselves steadfastly
remained, what they had always been, eminently
practical men;20
and they consistently protected their monopoly.2
Probably the form that copyright took after the Charter was
granted-registration of the title of a book in the Company
registers in the name of a member-was the continuation of a
practice begun before the Charter made the guild of stationers a
London Company. In any event, it is proper to characterize the
first English copyright, the stationers' copyright, as a private-law
copyright. It was defined only in the ordinances of the Stationers'
Company, self-governance being one of the prerogatives of a London
Company.' This private-law copyright (for the benefit of publishers) antedated the public-law copyright (for the benefit of the
public) by a century and a half and had all the features that made
it effective as a basis for the Company's monopoly and as a tool for
governmental censorship. The private-law copyright was available

' 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, JR., POLICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 478 (1953).
19 Id.

20Id.

21Id.
22 See generally CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS' COMPANY, A HISTORY, 1403-1959
(1960) (detailing history of the Company).
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only to members of the Stationers' Company, could be transferred
and sold in perpetuity, and did not require any writing by the
copyright claimant.
The stationers' copyright produced no controversy as to either its
source or its nature. There was no reason it should have. The
stationers created their copyright, shaped it to their ends, and kept
control of it for themselves. All this they were able to do not only
because their royal Charter gave them the power to control printing
presses, but because their copyright paralleled the reign of press
control in England.' Censorship needed a perpetual copyright for
obvious reasons. Perpetual copyright precluded the public domain
for literature, which could not be tolerated by a government
dedicated to censorship and press control. Writings in the public
domain are free for all to publish-without a licenser's imprimatur.
Thus, the end of legal support for the stationers' copyright
also-without fanfare-meant the creation of a public domain for
literature. While this watershed event apparently has received
little attention, it happened with the final demise in 1694 of the
Licensing Act of 1662 2 --the last of the licensing decrees-which
ended the public-law support for the stationers' copyright as well
as press control. The death of the private-law copyright in theory
meant that no law-neither statutory nor judicial-protected
anyone's exclusive right to publish a book, either in perpetuity or
otherwise. But the stationers' monopoly of the booktrade was so
strong that the stationers' copyright continued to be used as a
private copyright for Company members in support of their
monopoly.
The booksellers, however, wanted (and needed) statutory support
for what they would later contend was the author's common-law
right, and they petitioned Parliament to restore the condition they
considered necessary for the continuation of their monopoly-governmental censorship. Thus, their initial pleas were for

2

During this time, the stationers continually petitioned the government for decrees and

acts of censorship that protected their copyright, in part because the vagaries of politics led

to the beheading of Charles I in 1649 and the Puritans' rule until Charles II returned from
his travels in 1660. For a detailed discussion of the decrees and acts of censorship, see
generally PATrERSON, supra note 14, at 114-42 (sixth chapter entitled "Copyright and
Censorship").
2 Licensing Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. II, ch. 33 (Eng.).
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new censorship legislation to protect the government (and themselves). Only when these pleas failed did they make their plea for
a copyright to protect the author.'
Parliament eventually responded to the plea for an author's
copyright with the Statute of Anne in 1710.' The characterization of the statutory copyright as an author's copyright, however,
is one of the great canards of history. While that Statute made
copyright available to authors for the first time, there was only one
benefit for the author that was not available for the bookseller-the
renewal term-and the Statute was designed to destroy (and
prevent the recurrence of) the booksellers' monopoly. Thus the
Statute of Anne can best be characterized as an anti-censorship
trade regulation statute. Analysis shows that Parliament avoided
vesting statutory copyright with features that made its private-law
27
predecessor so effective a tool of both censorship and monopoly.
It did so by making the new statutory copyright available only for
new writings, by limiting the term of the new statutory copyright
to two terms of fourteen years (the second term being available only
to the author if living at the end of the first term), by making it
available to anyone entitled thereto (not merely members of the
Stationers' Company), and by including in the new copyright act a
list of officials to whom a complaint could be made if the booksellers charged too high a price for books (the same officials listed as
licensers in the Licensing Act).
The booksellers thus properly viewed the Statute of Anne as a
great threat to their monopolistic control of literature and learning
for private profit. The realization of the threat, however, was
delayed for twenty-one years by the Statute's continuation of the
stationers' copyrights for that period of time. In 1731, when the
grace period ended, the booksellers began their campaign to regain
the legal control of copyright they had lost by the demise of the
Licensing Act of 1662 (and by the passage of the new copyright
statute).
The details of the booksellers' efforts have been recounted
25 See

generally PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 127-34 (for account of the stationers'

petitions).
' Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
See generally L. Ray Patterson, The Statute of Anne: CopyrightMisconstrued, 3 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 223 (1966) (analyzing Statute of Anne provisions).
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elsewhere.' The point here is that to regain control of copyright,
the booksellers had to devise a strategy to secure judicial recognition of the stationers' copyright in the guise of a common-law
copyright that would override the statutory copyright. This was no
easy task. The common-law courts had never exercised jurisdiction
over copyright (presumably because of press control policies);29
and prior to the Statute of Anne, the author had never been eligible
for copyright (because of the stationers' monopoly in controlling the
booktrade).
This background explains why the booksellers concentrated on
the source of copyright in order to turn a legal question into a
political question. They did so by arguments intended to elicit
sympathy for the author (conveniently ignoring their role in
creating the poor plight of the author that they bemoaned) and
avoided sound logic and reason. Although the claim for an author's
natural-law right was to rebut the charge of monopoly, the
booksellers also claimed the author's right to assign those rights to
a bookseller.31 The right of assignment was the political ploy, for
it meant both that authors could be deprived of their "natural law"
rights by contract, and that the booksellers' monopoly would be
enhanced by that same contract. Even so, the Court of King's
Bench in Millar v. Taylor gave the booksellers what they wanted
32
and recognized the author's common-law copyright in perpetuity.
(It may not have hurt that Lord Mansfield, the chief justice of the
King's Bench and the senior judge of the three supporting the

See generally AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES OF THE LAW AND HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT (London, Cassell 1899); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT
(1967); PATTERSON, supra note 14; PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 5.
1 CROSSKEY & JEFFREY, supra note 18, at 477, 481.
so Id. at 479. As Augustine Birrell said: "It is of great significance that at no time during
the manuscript period [i.e., prior to the printing press) was any claim for author's copyright
made or asserted." BIRRELL, supra note 28, at 49-50.
"1"Ifthe copy of the book belonged to the author, there is no doubt but that he might
transfer it to the plaintiff. And if the plaintiff, by the transfer, is to become the proprietor
of the copy, there is as little doubt that the defendant has done him an injury, and violated
his right: for which, this action is the proper remedy." Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201,
206 (K.B. 1769) (Willes, J.).
= Id. at 201.
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booksellers, had represented booksellers in prior litigation.)"
The Millar ruling, however, lasted only five years before the
House of Lords overturned it in Donaldson v. Beckett ' in 1774.
The precise issue presented to the Lords (in the form of several
questions) was whether, by reason of the natural law, the author
had a common-law copyright in his or her works that existed in
perpetuity despite the Statute of Anne's limited-term copyright.
The Lords held that the author does have a common-law copyright,
but that it exists only until the work is published. After publication, the work goes into the public domain except for such rights as
the copyright statute provides.
The most significant point about Donaldson is that it was a
compromise, i.e., a political, decision. The Lords, by holding that
the common law was the source of the author's copyright prior to
publication, appeared to give the author a victory. But the
common-law copyright, being only the right offirst publication,was
no copyright at all since it did not entail the exclusive right of
The common-law copyright concept,
continued publication.
however, proved to be very useful to those claiming that the
natural law was the source of the statutory copyright. Their
argument was that the common-law copyright, clearly a product of
natural law, was the source of the statutory copyright and therefore
that the statutory copyright was merely the securing of a naturallaw right. Thus, the harm of the Donaldson ruling was that it laid
the groundwork for the future enhancement of the copyright
monopoly on the basis of the natural-law-property theory. In a
sense, the booksellers, while losing the battle, won the war for their
successors.
B. THE AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING

The American understanding of copyright as of May 2, 1783, is
indicated by a Continental Congress Resolution of that date
recommending "the several States to secure to the Authors or

'I was counsel in most of the cases which have been cited from Chancery: ... The first
case of Milton's Paradise Lost was upon my motion. I argued the case of Miliar against
Kincaid, in the House of Lords.' Id. at 257.
' 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).
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Publishers of New Books the Copyright of such Books,'
twelve of the thirteen states had done by

1 7 8 7 .'

which

The Resolution

defined copyright as the "exclusive right of printing, publishing and
vending" books, 7 and the inference is clear: As Donaldson had
held, without a statute the author had no exclusive right of
printing, publishing and vending his or her writings that continued
after they were first published.' The common-law rule thus made
it desirable that Congress have the power to secure to authors
nationwide protection for the exclusive right to publish and vend
their writings.
The Continental Congress Resolution is particularly strong
evidence of the American understanding of the legislature as the
proper source of copyright because the resolution was in response
to the report of a committee whose membership of three included
James Madison (who was to play a major role in drafting the
Constitution a few years later). It was Madison who argued the
desirability of the Copyright Clause in No. 43 of The Federalist
Papers.9 The states, he said, could not effectively provide such
rights, the inference being that the rights could not be uniformly
protected by state law-either statutory or common law-in a
federal system and had to be secured by national legislation.
The state copyright statutes, most of which were enacted in
response to the Continental Congress Resolution, were modeled on
the Statute of Anne and thus presaged the inevitable. The federal
copyright was to be a direct descendant of its English counterpart.
The language in the United States Copyright Clause was almost
surely taken from the title of the Statute of Anne of 1710; 40 the
American Copyright Act of 179041 is a copy of the English Act; and
the United States Supreme Court in its first copyright case,

M COPYRIGHT OFFICE BULLETIN No. 3, CONTINENTAL CONGRESS RESOLUTION OF MAY 2,
1783, aupra note 15, at 1.
" Modeled on the Statute of Anne to varying degrees, the state copyright statutes had
two characteristics of particular interest today: (1) Many of them justified copyright
protection as a natural-law right of the author; and (2) almost all of them treat the right to
vend as a part of, and thus a limitation on, the reproduction right. See id. at 1-21.
37 id. at 1.
Donakison, 1 Eng. Rep. at 840.
"THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
4o S Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
411 Stat. 124 (1790) (passed during the second session of the first Congress).
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Wheaton v. Peters,4 2 used Donaldson v. Beckett as guiding precedent in confirming
copyright as the grant of a limited statutory
43
monopoly.
The framers of the Constitution thus incorporated the English
experience into the Copyright Clause and thereby ensured that
both Congress and the Supreme Court would do likewise. While
the framers may not have had complete knowledge of the historical
details of the early English copyright, they surely understood the
importance of the ideas they took from the Statute of Anne and
wrote into the Constitution: the promotion of learning, the
protection of the public domain, and the limited benefit to the
author. Therefore, the English Statute is a useful annotation for
understanding "the exclusive Right" in the context of the policies
contained in the Copyright Clause.
1. The Promotionof Learning. Given the historical context from
which the Statute of Anne emerged, it seems clear that the
promotion of learning was an anti-censorship, or free-speech, policy.
Thus, the statutory copyright was limited to new writings that had
to be published (without any licenser's imprimatur) in order to
secure the limited term of copyright.
At this late date, it is difficult to appreciate the Statute of Anne
as a source of free-speech rights or to understand that freedom of
learning in 1710 was relatively new, having existed only since
1694. Thus, it is useful to note the origins of the pre-statutory
copyright as described by Augustine Birrell:
In considering the origin of copyright, two things
must never be forgotten. First, the Church and her
priesthood, frightened-and who dare say unreasonably frightened?-at the New Learning, and at the
independence and lawlessness of mind and enthusiasm that accompanied the New Learning; and,
second, the guilds or trade unions, jealous of their
privileges, ever at war one with another, and making
their appeal to the Crown for protection against
outside interference with their strictly defined

42 33

U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
4'Id. at 595.
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domains of business."

Just as copyright sprang from "the censorship of the Press and the
monopoly of the booksellers,"' 5 resulting from a frightened priesthood and a fearful monarch, so did the freedom of learning in the
guise of the freedom of religion and the free press."
The new statutory copyright took the same form as the stationers' copyright, registration in the register books of the Company.
But we can assume-on the basis of provisions in the Statute-that
Parliament was not willing to risk the loss of the new freedom of
learning by allowing copyright again to be used as a device of
censorship or an instrument of monopoly. The evidence is that
Parliament used the Licensing Act of 1662 as a model ot'both what
to do and what not to do. In addition to requiring a new writing
andpublication as conditions precedent for copyright and limiting
the term of copyright as a condition subsequent, Parliament also
made clear that the importation of books in foreign languages
printed overseas was not to be forbidden," as they could have
been under the Licensing Act.'
The lesson from the stationers' copyright that remains relevant,
however, is that copyright is a means of information control. This
is so whether the control is exercised in the interest of the government's political power or in the interest of the copyright owner's
private profit. As such, copyright can be used to inhibit rather
than to promote learning. This explains why in the United States
from 1790 (the date of the first Federal Copyright Act) to 1978 (the
effective date of the 1976 Act), there were two conditions necessary

"BIRRELL, supra note 28, at 19.
4'Id. at 51.
"This unhappy history, then, explains why the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution have a common origin: they are both products of the
Tudor and Stuart policies of press control, which lasted until 1694, shortly after the Glorious
Revolution in 1688, when the Protestant Succession in England was assured. It also
explains the political origin of copyright.
47 Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 8 (1710) (Eng.). The prohibition did not extend to
books in the English language printed overseas, which provided protection for a domestic
industry.
48 Licensing Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. II, ch. 33, § 5 (Eng.). Section 5 required that all
books from overseas be brought to the port of London to be examined for 'heretical, seditious
and dangerous books."
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for copyright: (1) a new writing, and (2) publication of that
writing.'4 The 1976 Copyright Act eliminated the condition of
publication. Herein lies the importance of understanding "the
exclusive Right" that Congress is empowered to secure as the right
to publish and vend. The absence of the publication requirement
means, in effect, the availability of an unconditional copyright as
a means of information control to inhibit learning, the very misuse
of copyright the framers sought to guard against. This is why
under the Constitution the Congress can grant only a copyright
that ensures public access to the copyrighted material. This is the
real significance of the meaning of "the exclusive Right" as the
right to publish and vend.
2. The Public Domain. A vitally important part of the statutory
scheme of the 1710 Copyright Statute for the promotion of learning
was the protection of the public domain, which can be said to have
come into existence in 1694, the date of the final demise of the
Licensing Act of 1662. Recall that the stationers' copyright was
available for any book regardless of age (provided a fellow stationer
did not hold the copyright) and that the stationers' copyright
existed in perpetuity. Thus, the Statute of Anne's requirement of
a new writing and its limited term of copyright were integral parts
of the statutory scheme that protected the public domain, as the
drafters of the Copyright Clause presumably realized.
According to William Crosskey, the framers placed limitations on
Congress's power to secure copyright in order to eliminate the
author's perpetual copyright, which would have effectively destroyed the public domain. Said Crosskey:
[T]hose limitations were expressed, first, because the
Convention did not desire that Congress should have
any power to grant perpetual copyrights; and, second, because it did desire, by restricting Congress to
the creation of limited rights, to extinguish, by plain
implication of "the supreme Law of the Land," the

The former requirement protected works in the public domain from recapture by
copyright; the latter meant that the public would have uninhibited access to writings
protected by copyright. Once a book is on the shelf of a free lending library, it is free for all
to read.
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perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law."

Crosskey's analysis may describe more accurately the desires of
Parliament in using the statutory copyright to replace the stationers' copyright than the desires of the members of the Convention.
But if we assume that the framers were familiar with the stationers' copyright, their words speak from knowledge; if they were not
familiar with the early English copyright, their words speak from
wisdom and foresight. In any event, Crosskey's analysis is
supported by the words of the Constitution.
It is ironic, then, that the public-domain policy seems to be the
least appreciated of all the policies in the Copyright Clause.
Consider, for example, the extension of the term of copyright in the
1976 Copyright Act for four or more generations, a lengthy
copyright available for ephemeral works as well as permanent
works. The reason for this myopia probably is that the public
domain is the one copyright concept that entrepreneurs cannot
manipulate as they can, for example, the author's copyright. Once
a work is in the public domain, it is not subject to recapture by
copyright (although it is not clear that all American courts
understand this point).51 Copyright entrepreneurs thus see the
public domain as the greatest threat to their opportunity for profit.
The importance of the public domain, however, is obscured not
only by the copyright owners' opportunity for increased profit, but
also by the persistence of the theory that the natural law is the
source of copyright. The Lords' decision in Donaldson should have
ended that theory in England, just as the Supreme Court's reliance
on Donaldson in Wheaton should have disposed of the issue for the
United States. Yet, nineteenth-century writers on copyright con-

50

1CROSSKEY & JEFFREY, supra note 18, at 486.
" See, eg., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Minn. 1985)
(granting West Publishing copyright protection for pagination of its law reporters), afftd, 799
F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). See also Feist Publications v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (undermining West Publishing by denying
copyrightability of telephone directory white pages); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce,
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Law Reports and Statutory
Compilations,36 U.C.L.
L. REV. 719 (1989) (offering critical view of West Publishing).
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tinually promoted the natural-law theory."2 And despite the
Supreme Court's continual rulings to the contrary, judicial
decisions suggest that copyright as the natural-law "property" right
of the author continues to find favor with some lower courts.'
Apart from the intuitive appeal of the notion that one "owns"
what he or she creates, the persistence of the natural-law copyright
theory is due in part to the House of Lords's compromise decision
in Donaldson. Although the Lords decided that the right of
copyright after publication is a statutory monopoly, the so-called
common-law copyright they created had no basis other than the
natural law. They thereby gave credibility to the Millar case even
as they overruled it. Yet, the public domain-protected by both the
writing requirement and the limited term-is as important today
as it was when the framers made it an integral part of the
Constitution. As President George Washington said in a message
to Congress on January 8, 1790 that led to the enactment of the
1790 Copyright Act: "Knowledge is, in every country, the surest

Eaton S. Drone, author of the leading copyright treatise of the nineteenth century,
argued strongly for the author's perpetual, ie., natural-law, copyright. "To say the authors
have rights of property in their literary productions, and that they are lost by publication,
which is their very source of value, is absurd." DRONE, supra note 9, at 13. "[The copyright
statute which deprives authors of property in their intellectual productions after a term of
years, cannot be defended on any principle which sanctions the taking of private property
for public uses, or which justifies the regulation of private property for the common welfare.'
Id. at 19.
An article in The American Juristand Law Magazine issue of July 1833 takes the same
view, claiming that "an author, according to all rules of law, has perpetual copyright."
Joseph K. Angel, LiteraryProperty, 10 AM. JURST & L. MAG. 62, 80 (Boston, Lilly, Wait &
Co. 1833).
A review by Philip H. Nicklin of a book entitled REMARKS ON LITERARY PROPERTY quotes
the author as having a similar view: "I incline to the belief that authors should have fu/
property in perpetuity; that is to say, that they, their heirs and assigns, should possess the
entire control over their works forever .... " Philip H. Nicklin, Review of Remarks on
LiteraryProperty, 19 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 476,477-78 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James
Brown 1838). The reviewer expressed the opinion that this proposal was impractical. Id.
at 479.
" Cf. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding
copying for internal use by a commercial research library does not constitute fair use); Basic
Books v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that copying
excerpts from books without copyright owner's permission to make college course packets
constitutes copyright infringement).
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basis of public happiness."' That source of happiness is unlawfully rationed to the extent that copyright usurps the public domain
beyond its constitutional limits.
3. The Author's Right. One of the many ironies of copyright law
is the use of the term "author's copyright" by reason of the Statute
of Anne (and the language in the Copyright Clause taken from the
English Act). The irony is that the Statute of Anne' did not
provide for an author's copyright. The statutory copyright was the
stationers' copyright with a limited term and thus a publisher's
copyright made available to authors. Statutory copyright did not
even come into existence until the book to be copyrighted was
published, which required a publisher, who could-and normally
did-exact the assignment of the copyright in partial payment for
his services.
Indeed, James Madison in the Continental Congress Resolution
recommended that states secure copyright to publishers or
authors," a recommendation that may give some significance to
the exclusion of publishers from the Copyright Clause. Whether
the omission was a matter of style or substance, we cannot know.
But we do know that the monopoly problem of copyright was
created by publishers, not authors. And we know of the efforts
publishers made to secure perpetual copyright for authors that
would benefit the entrepreneur more than the creator. The notion
of the author's copyright is thus a result of botched copyright
theory, primarily in the Lords' ruling in Donaldson.
Even at this late date it is well to understand why. There are at
least two reasons. One is that the Lords gave credence to the
natural-law theory by creating an ersatz copyright that existed only
prior to publication. A more subtle reason is that the booksellers
never presented the courts with a properly framed issue as to what
the natural-law versus statutory-grant controversy entailed.
To argue-as the booksellers did-that copyright is a natural-law
right of the author without more is to imply that the issue is the
natural right of the author vel non, with no regard for the rights of

"Address from George Washington to Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), in COPYRIGHT IN
CONGRESS, 1789-1904, at 115 (Gov. Printing Office, 1905).
58 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
"COPYRIGHT OFFICE BuLLETIN NO. 3, supra note 15, at 1.
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others, and so the courts treated it. But this malformation of the
issue as between the author and nobody obscured the impact of a
natural-law copyright on the natural-law rights of members of the
public as users. Persons in a free society have as much of a
natural-law right to learning as an author has to exclusive
publication. Properly framed, then, the real issue was the right of
the author to publish in perpetuity (and thus to subject the
materials of learning to private control forever) versus the right of
persons to use published writings freely after a limited period of
monopoly (by reason of the public domain). Since the user's right
was protected by the public domain, the properly formulated
issue-the right of the author to control publication of his or her
work in perpetuity versus the right of individual members of the
public to use the work for learning-would have made clear what
history tells us: Copyright is an intrusion upon the common-law
public domain. 7
The conclusion, however, was not accepted, apparently because
it was not recognized that Millar's" natural-law theory of copyright is based on two notions that turn out to be fallacies. The first
notion is that an author is entitled to copyright protection because
he or she creates a work; the second is that no one is entitled to
reap where he or she has not sown. The two fallacies are: (1) that
an author creates a work out of private materials that he or she
owns as the carpenter owns the wood out of which he fashions a
cabinet; and (2) that the author does not reap where he or she has
not sown. These two fallacies combine to obscure the free-ride
aspect of copyright.
The author does not own the materials out of which he or she
creates a work and always reaps where he or she has not sown.
Will it be denied, that the most original writer is the
work of his own age and of former ages, as much at
least as of his own proper genius; that the general
domain has furnished him with the elements of the
7

See David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn,
1981, at 147 (arguing that "recognition of new intellectual property rights should be offset
today by equally deliberate recognition of individual rights in the public domain").
" Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 257-62 (KB. 1769).
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ideas which he has elaborated; that in restoring
them to the civilization to which he is indebted for
them, he acquits himself of a duty toward humanity..."
The point is best demonstrated, perhaps, by Shakespeare, whose
plays, in terms of modern copyright law, are derivative works.'
A modern example is Eugene O'Neill, who owes much to Aeschylus
1 And Justice Story wrote in
for his Mourning Becomes Electra."
1845: "Ifno book could be the subject of copy-right which was not
new and original in the elements of which it is composed, there
could be no ground for any copy-right in modern times .. .. 62

There is, then, no justification for the author's perpetual copyright
to be substituted for the public domain.
The author who has an exclusive right to publish and vend his
work for a limited period of time is amply rewarded for his or her
efforts. The constitutional limitations on the benefit that Congress

" Charles Renouard, Theory of the Rights ofAuthors, 22 Am. JURIST & L. MAG. 39, 43
(Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839).
Editors often name Shakespeare's sources in the introduction to the plays. See, e.g.,
WmAAm SHAKESPEARE, THE LONDON SHAKESPEARE (John Munroe ed., 1957). In this work,
the editor tells us that "As You Like It was directly and closely based on Lodge's novel
Rosalynde. Euphues Golden Legacie...." I id. at 593. "Shakespeare's main source for this
play [Julius Caesar] was North's translation of Amyot's French translation of Plutarch's
Lives of Caesar, Brutus and Antony, first published in 1579, and from 1595, printed by
Shakespeare's Stratford friend, Richard Field .... Shakespeare selected such incidents and
passages as suited his dramatic purpose, in places adopting North's own words .... " V id.
at 259. "The actual source (of Othe/lo] was Novel VII of the Third Decade in the Hecatomithi
of Geraldi Cinthio, published in Monreale in 1565 and in Venice in 1567. It was not
translated into English in Shakespeare's time; but a close translation into French by Gabriel
Chapuys appeared in Paris in 1584 .... The transmutation in the play of Cinthio's novel,
of which the main lines are preserved, has had much comment: 'out subsiste en effet,'
writes Guizot, 'et tout est changd.'" V id. at 724-25. "Shakespeare's main source for the play
[Henry V] was Holinshead, which he follows in places so closely that the book must have
been open before him." IV id. at 1020.
Indeed, Shakespeare was so "derivative" that the sources of his plays are published in
eight volumes in NARRATIVE AND DRAMATIC SOURCES OF SHAKESPEARE (Geoffrey Bullough
ed., 1973).
61

EUGENE O'NEILL, MOURNING BECOMES ELECTRA, (1931).

' Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (involving
copyright infringement of elementary arithmetic text book).
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can grant to authors are thus more than justified.
C. NATURAL AND POSITIVE-LAW RIGHTS

Of the three policies in the Copyright Clause-the promotion of
learning, protection of the public domain, and benefit to authors-two are intended to benefit the public, one the author. Only
the benefit to the author, however, has been claimed to be a
natural-law right. And this is true despite the fact that the benefit
to authors serves only as a means; the author's right, granted for
only a limited time, is to promote learning as its end.
There are two explanations for the continued claims as to the
author's natural-law right. One is that the theory is to the
advantage of publishers, whose ulterior motives are disguised by a
false implication that the theory is primarily to benefit the author.
The other is that writers generally treat the issue of the naturallaw basis for a right and the issue of the scope of that right as
being the same. The assumption seems to be that if the author's
copyright is a natural-law right, it provides the author with
absolute dominion over the work and exists in perpetuity.
This is a one-dimensional treatment of a three-dimensional
problem. The natural-law right of the author has two aspects: the
basis of the right and the scope of the right in terms of time and
control. The scope of the right is the aspect that has generally been
ignored, presumably because the common-law copyright-based on
the natural law--existed in perpetuity so long as the work was not
published and thus gave the author absolute dominion as a matter
of fact, which did not require theory.'
The common-law copyright, however, provides no rationale for
features of the statutory copyright protecting published works, both
because the common-law copyright was not a copyright and because
the scope of the author's natural-law right in the work changes
with publication.
"A work before it is published belongs only to the author; it is his spoken or written
meditation, his thought, his intellectual being; it is himself; the author is not bound to
account for it to any one, and is the absolute master to modify or destroy it. The fruit which
he then draws from it is the well-being of study, the enjoyment of labor and of the exercise
of his faculties; it is that pleasure of creation which is produced by the birth of ideas."
Renouard, supra note 59, at 43.
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It may be demanded, whether an author, who has
communicated his ideas by publication, and, in
return, has received influence, honor, and perhaps
profit from such communication, can, after having
obtained these advantages, break the association into
which he has caused the public to enter, and, at his
pleasure, withdraw the share furnished by himself.
Will it not be admitted, that if the public has gained
knowledge of the work, the author, on his part, has
gained a public?"

And having gained a public, does not the author owe an obligation
to the members of his or her public not to deny them the use of the
work, even while retaining the copyright?" Can the author use
his or her work to assert influence over the thinking of others and
then retain absolute dominion over the instrument of that influence?
The author's act of publication thus brings into play the rights of
others. And to say that the author's natural-law right in the work
continues after publication is tantamount to saying that the author
has a natural-law right to influence others by information control,
that is, by controlling access to his or her work. But this right
comes into conflict with the right of others to learn without being
subjected to the vagaries of censorship, whether in the form of a tax
on learning or otherwise. The point can be made with a question:
What justification is there for giving a mortal author perpetual
control of his or her writings consisting of materials taken from the
public domain?
A more important question is why have writers on copyright been
able to keep the notion of the author's natural-law copyright in the
forefront despite the Supreme Court's continual assertion that
copyright is a positive-law concept, a limited statutory grant
intended primarily to benefit the public interest? As good a guess
as any is that few have bothered to analyze the meaning of "the
exclusive Right" in the Copyright Clause as being only the right to

"Id.
There is a distinction between the use of the work and the use of the copyright. See
PATrERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 5, at 14.
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publish and vend one's own writings. For once this point is
recognized, the natural-law pattern of the Clause emerges in a
different form.
The freedom to learn is a natural-law right and the materials of
learning are a necessary condition for the exercise of that right.
Even if we say copyright has a natural-law basis, the benefit to the
author is a reward to induce the author to make his or her writings
public so that others may enjoy their natural-law right of learning.
Copyright thus is, and can be, only a positive-law concept, for only
a positive-law concept can serve to mediate two natural-law rights.
The Copyright Clause makes the point by recognizing the
natural-law right of the people to learn as well as the natural-law
right of the author to gain a profit. Thus, we come to the fundamental point. Copyright, whatever its basis, cannot co-exist as a
natural-law right in a society where learning is a natural-law right
and the public domain has a natural-law basis. Therefore,
American copyright must be-as the framers intended-a positivelaw concept, a legislative grant of limited rights conditioned on the
author's making his or her writing available to the public. This
principle was acknowledged in the Resolution of the Continental
Congress, implied in the Copyright Clause, and adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Wheaton. This is why the
copyright statutes do "not provide for the continuation of the
common-law [i.e., natural-law] right, but under constitutional
authority, created a new [statutory] right."6 The most important
natural-law right of the Copyright Clause is not the right of the
author to gain a profit, but the right of the people to learn: The
future of a society is determined by the learning of its citizens.
III. COPYRIGHT POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES

Of the three copyright policies in the Copyright Clause-the
promotion of learning, the protection of the public domain, and the
benefit to the author-two benefit both users and the public

" Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356, 362 (1908) (involving mainly a
jurisdictional issue of damages for infringement of a copyright); see also Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("As this Court has repeatedly said, the Congress did not
sanction an existing right, but created a new one.").
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interest. Despite the clarity of their statement, however, the rules
in the Copyright Act of 1976 are further removed from the public
interest than the rules in any copyright statute have ever been.
The policy of learning is attenuated because copyright no longer
requires a public distribution of the work; the public domain is
subordinated to the interest of the copyright owner because
copyright can now last for a century and more; and the benefit to
authors is lessened because (under the work-for-hire doctrine)
copyright is no longer limited to authors.
The divergence between copyright policies and copyright rules is
clearly due in part to the extension and modification of copyright
to modern communications technology. What is not so clear,
however, is that Congress in effect codified copyright principles in
the Copyright Act of 1976. This result, however, may be more the
product of the limiting policies of the Copyright Clause than
conscious concern for the public welfare. As Jessica Litman has so
clearly demonstrated, the industry plays a dominant role in
shaping copyright legislation with small-minded concerns, weighted
as they are by the desire for control and profit."7 Thus, the
Copyright Act contains any number of instances showing the
industry's fingerprints with intent to influence judicial construction
of the statute.
The industry's fingerprints mean that the codification of the
policies becomes clear only if they are viewed in the context of the
Copyright Clause and only if one assumes that the rules are to be
interpreted as part of a coherent and consistent statute. The
policies in the Copyright Clause are important because Congress
had to relate them to the rules to be enacted. This meant that the
legislature had to cross the intellectual gulf between policies and
rules with a logical bridge of principles. These principles, deduced
7

"A review of the 1976 Copyright Act's legislative history demonstrates that Congress
and the Registers of Copyrights actively sought compromises negotiated among those with
economic interests in copyright and purposefully incorporated those compromises into the
copyright revision bill, even when they disagreed with their substance. Moreover, both the
Copyright Office and Congress intended from the beginning to take such an approach, and
designed a legislative process to facilitate it. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise,
and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 879 (1987); see also Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275 (1989) (critically
examining how copyright statutes are drafted through negotiations among industry
representatives).
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from the policies, are the source of the rules and serve as propositions of transition that enable one to move from policy to rule
without having to make logical leaps that leave a void in one's
reasoning. Therefore, Congress used principles to bridge the gap
between the rules it considered and the policies it had to implement
in much the same way one unconsciously uses the multiplication
tables to determine that eight times eight is sixty-four.
A short essay does not provide the space for discussion of more
than a few copyright principles. Those here discussed are: (1)
copyright is the grant of a limited monopoly for a limited period
(the limited-grant principle); (2) a copyright is separate from its
work (the separation principle); (3) the copyright owner can control
the copyright only for the primary market (the primary-market
principle); and (4) learning requires access to the work to be
learned (the accessibility principle).
A. THE LMITED-GRANT PRINCIPLE

The limited-grant principle--copyright is the statutory grant of
a monopoly limited in scope as well as time-is a necessary
corollary of all three stated policies of the Copyright Clause because
"the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose
may be achieved.' s The Supreme Court promulgated this principle in Wheaton v. Peters.' Thus, compliance with the publicinterest mandate explains why copyright "comprises a series of
carefully defined and carefully delimited interests to which the law
affords correspondingly exact protections, 70 and also why copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over
all possible uses of his work."71 Consequently, copyright can
consist only of a series of rights to which a work is subject for a
period certain. The limitations flow directly from "the exclusive
Right" that Congress can grant: the exclusive right to publish and
vend the work for a limited time. The Copyright Clause thus gives
Congress jurisdiction only over the copyright and denies it jurisdic-

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).

6 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
7"' Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985).
' Sony, 464 U.S. at 432.
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tion over the work itself, as the separation principle demonstrates.
B. THE SEPARATION PRINCIPLE

The separation principle--the copyright and a copy of the work
are separate legal entities subject to separate ownership, and both
are separate from the work, which can be owned by no one-is a
corollary of the limited-grant principle. The Supreme Court's most
famous statement of this principle is found in Baker v. Selden,72
which established the rule that copyright cannot protect ideas, and
therefore the copyright is separate from the work. The Supreme
Court's most definitive statement of the separation principle was,
however, in American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, in which the
Court said that it was not the "physical thing created (the copy),
publishing, copying, etc., which is within
but the right of printing,
74
statutory protection."

The crucial relevance of the separation principle is that no one
can own the work. The copyright of a work and a copy of that work
can be owned by different persons, and this difference in ownership
is the essence of copyright. As the Supreme Court in Werckmeister
stated, copyright "grows out of the recognition of the separate
ownership of the right of copying from that which inheres in the
mere physical control of the thing itself.", 7 Thus, the copyright
and the copy in which the work is embodied "are distinct subjects
and being owned and transof property, each capable of existing
7
1
other."
the
of
ferred independent
The separation principle is thus fundamental to copyright law.
The principle tells courts (and copyright owners) to distinguish:
(1) the existence of the copy from the existence of the copyright; (2)
the ownership of the copy from the ownership of the copyright; and
(3) the use of the copy from the use of the copyright."

These

101 U.S. 99, 101 (1879).
207 U.S. 284 (1907) (holding a painter does not transfer copyright of a painting when
selling
a painting).
4
7 1d. at 298.
71 Id. at 299.
" Id. at 298 (quoting Stephens v. Gladdis, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447, 452 (1854)).
73

7 This is the basis of the distinction between the use of the work and the use of the
copyright. See PArrERsoN & LINDBERG, supra note 5, at Ch. 14.
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distinctions flow from the fact that copyright is an instrument to
encourage copyright owners to distribute copies of the work in order
to promote learning, not an instrument to control use of the copies
after they have been distributed. The separation principle thus
enables one to determine when a use of the copy is a use of the
work and when it is a use of the copyright. This distinction follows
from the function of copyright-to protect the exclusive right to
publish and vend the work. The separation principle is thus a
corollary of the primary-market principle.
C. THE PRIMARY-MARKET PRINCIPLE
The primary-market principle-the copyright owner cannot
qualify the title of a lawfully purchased copy of the work-is a
recognition that the right to publish is limited by the right to vend
and grows out of the limited-grant principle. Therefore, it precludes the copyright owner from controlling the secondary market
for copies after he or she has sold them.
The Supreme Court apparently first utilized the primary-market
principle in an action in which the publisher (copyright owner)
sought to compel a retailer to sell books at the price set by the
publisher.7 The Court determined that when the copyright owner
sold a copy, it had exhausted the right to vend:
What the complainant contends for embraces not
only the right to sell the copies, but to qualify the
title of a future purchaser.... To add to the right of
exclusive sale the authority to control all future
retail sales... would give a right not included in the
terms of the statute ....
The premise of the primary-market principle is that the author
does not own the work.' This may explain why it is the most
78 Bobbs-Merrill
7

Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908).

Id. at 351 (emphasis added).

80 This point explains the Supreme Court's use of the primary-market principle in
InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press, a copyright case without the copyright.

International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (concerning INS's pirating
of AP news stories during World War I). The Court treated the news reports as quasi-
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misunderstood of the copyright principles, because copyright owners
in fact-if not theory-claim that they do. Consider, for example,
copyright notices that deny anyone the right to make any copy of
any portion of a work by any means for any purpose without the
written consent of the copyright owner. The Supreme Court in
Wheaton made clear the unlawfulness of such claims with its
"Is there an implied contract by every
rhetorical question:
purchaser of his book, that he may realize whatever instruction or
entertainment which the reading of it shall give, but shall not write
out or print its contents[?]" 1
As the question implies, when the primary-market principle is
violated, copyright effectively ceases to be a limited grant, the
separation principle ceases to have any meaning, and the right of
accessibility is diminished.
D. THE ACCESSIBILITY PRINCIPLE
The accessibility principle--the copyrighted work shall be
accessible to the public during the copyright term-is also predicated on the fact that neither author nor copyright owner (nor anyone
else) can own the work. The predicate is important because the
accessibility principle is the most fundamental copyright principle:
it is the means to the end. If the work can be owned, the owner
can control accessibility to it, and copyright can be used to inhibit,
rather than fulfill, its constitutional purpose of promoting learning.
This is why the limited-grant principle, the separation principle,
and the primary-market principle can be viewed as necessary

property as between competitors (not a property right against the public) and limited the
grant of relief to an injunction until the value of the news reports had passed. Id. at 245-46.
Thus, the Court in effect applied the primary-market principle, but its less than careful use
of language obscures its real import: no one (not even the proprietor) owns the work. BobbsMerrill,210 U.S. at 234-36. It was not the news reports that were quasi-property as between
competitors; it was the right to distribute first the news reports that one had prepared.
InternationalNews Serv., 248 U.S. at 239-40.
International News Service, by denying AP any property right against the public,
demonstrates the essence of the primary-market principle: the author (or copyright owner)
cannot qualify the title of the copy of a work that is published. Therefore, neither the author
nor the copyright owner can burden a published copy with restrictive covenants to impede
the public's right of learning.
8' Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1993

31

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 5

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 1:1

components of the accessibility principle. If copyright is not a
limited grant that separates the work from the copyright and limits
the copyright owner's control of copyright to the primary market,
the copyright owner would be given the power of private censorship
for personal gain or power.
The Supreme Court in Sony82 used the accessibility principle.
In Sony, the copyright owners of motion pictures licensed their
performance for television and sought to have the Court hold that
an individual who videotaped the motion pictures for his or her own
personal use infringed the copyright. The copyright owner provided
only ephemeral accessibility in a rigid time frame, thereby severely
limiting the opportunity for learning. The Court held that the fairuse doctrine permitted the individual to videotape the copyrighted
motion pictures for his or her own personal use.'
The most
important Supreme Court implementation of the accessibility
principle, however, is Feist because it constitutionalizes the right
to use uncopyrightable material in a copyrighted work."
These four interrelated copyright principles derive from the
proposition that no one can own a work. Therefore, all of them are
necessary for integrity in the administration of copyright law. As
used here, integrity means the interrelation of the parts to the
whole and to each other in order to accomplish the basic purpose
of a particular body of law. The purpose in this instance is the
promotion of learning to benefit the public; if any of the principles
is disregarded, that purpose suffers.
IV. COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES AND RULES IN THE 1976 ACTe

Just as policies are the source of principles, principles are the
source of rules. Therefore, Congress derived the rules in the 1976
Act from copyright principles, in effect codifying the principles it
used. The 1976 Act does essentially three things: it defines
copyrightable works, grants rights to the copyright owner, and
limits those rights by defining them and limiting their scope.
' Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
3 Id. at 442.
"Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
' Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988 & Supp. II 1991 & Supp. III 1992
& Supp. IV 1993).
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Although the Act contains some seventy-eight sections, the core
provisions are contained in only five sections: section 102, the
requirements of copyrightable subject matter; section 103, the scope
of copyright protection for derivative works and compilations;
section 106, the grant of rights section; section 107, the fair-use
section; and section 201, defining the ownership of copyright. The
remaining seventy-three sections serve to embroider the framework
of the core sections with details and to complete the regulatory
pattern of the Statute.
A. SECTIONS

102 & 201: LIMITED-GRANT PRINCIPLE

The limited-grant principle finds expression in section 1 0 2 ,M
which does two things: section 102(a) limits copyright to original
works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression; and
section 102(b) denies copyright protection to facts, whether merely
in the form of an idea or embodied in procedures, processes,
systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries.
Section 102 thus limits copyright to original works of authorship
and therefore states the condition precedent for copyright.
Section 201,87 by vesting the ownership of copyright initially in
the author, is another manifestation of the limited-grant principle.
There was, of course, no need for Congress to grant ownership of
the work to its author, who controls the initial disposition of the
work by reason of physical control. Recognizing this-as well as
the constitutional limitations on its power-Congress granted
ownership only of the copyright, making copyright only a limited
grant to which the work is subject. The point here is that the work
and the copyright are separate, which the statute makes explicit in
section 202.
B. SECTIONS 202 & 103: SEPARATION PRINCIPLE

The separation principle is the source of section 202,s8 which
provides that ownership of a copyright is distinct from ownership
' Id. § 102 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
7Id. §

201 (1988).

" Id. § 202.
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of the material object in which a work may be embodied. Section
103" is derived from the same principle. It provides copyright
protection for derivative works and compilations, with one major
limitation. Because such works are only partly original, the section
103 copyright provides only partial copyright protection, limiting
the copyright protection to the original contributions of the
derivative or compilation author.
Section 103 is thus a corollary of the limited-grant principle-it
limits the scope of copyright protection-and is derived from the
separation principle-because the work and the copyright must be
distinguished in order to determine the scope of copyright protection.
C. SECTIONS 109 & 106: PRIMARY-MARKET PRINCIPLE

The primary-market principle is utilized in section 109, which
authorizes the owner of a particular copy to sell or otherwise
dispose of that copy without the authority of the copyright owner.'c Once the copy has been sold, the primary market for that
copy is automatically exhausted. It becomes-in modern advertising parlance-a pre-owned copy.
A more subtle manifestation of the primary-market principle is
section 106,91 which grants five rights to the copyright owner: the
right to reproduce the work in copies; the right to prepare derivative works; the right to distribute copies publicly; the right to
perform the work publicly; and the right to display the work
publicly. The public limitation on the right to distribute, perform,
and display effectively limits these rights to the primary market,
and section 106 is a codification of the primary-market principle in
the form of a multi-faceted rule.

Id. § 103.
0 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988) codifies the first sale doctrine and is unique in two respects: (1)

it is the most direct codification of a principle; and (2) it manifests the other three of the four
principles discussed above. The rule that the purchaser of a copy may dispose of that copy
as he or she wishes has two effects. It limits the power of the copyright owner over the
copyright and it increases the power of the user over the work. Thus the rule reflects the
limited-grant principle, the separation principle, the primary-market principle, and the
accessibility principle.
9' Id. § 106 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
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It is the multiple parts that obscure the rule as a codification of
the primary-market principle." The different parts enable copyright owners to treat the rights as separate and distinct from each
other. This is error based on the false premise that ownership of
the copyright entails ownership of the work, and that one who
"owns" the work has the absolute right to prevent any copying of
it-just as one has the absolute right not to lend another his or her
item of personalty. The copyright owner, however, does not "own"
the work, only the copyright.
D. SECTIONS

107 (& 108): ACCESSIBILITY PRINCIPLE

The elimination of the publication requirement as a condition for
copyright and the extension of copyright to a term of seventy-five
or one hundred years created a substantial risk to the public's
accessibility to the copyrighted work. The rational justification for
the codification of the fair-use doctrine is that it is a means of
resolving this problem by making the copyrighted work accessible
for learning.
Some courts, however, have taken a narrow view of fair use and
given it the opposite effect. For it is only when the fair-use
doctrine is interpreted in the light of the constitutional purpose of
copyright-the promotion of learning-that it clearly becomes a
codification of the accessibility principle. Supporting this view is
the fact that the four fair-use factors in section 10713 are directed
to the primary market. Except for the nature of the use, the
factors are derived from Folsom v. Marsh,"4 in which Justice Story
promulgated the fair-use doctrine to prevent competing authors
from making a wholesale use of the copyrighted work, for example,

"Since the copyright is composed of several rights, and since the rights are granted in
one section of the statute, they are properly interpreted only in relation to each other. Thus,
it is necessary to copy the work to distribute it publicly, and it is appropriate to copy the
work to perform or to display it publicly. Therefore, to say that the copyright owner has the

absolute right to copy the work independently of the public distribution right is to negate the
statute's limitation of the copyright owner's control to the primary market.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
" 9 F. Cas. 342,344-45 (1841) (No. 4901) (holding multi-volume biography about George

93

Washington was infringed by an abridgement).
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by abridgement." The major purpose of the fair-use doctrine as
first promulgated thus was to protect the primary market for the
author as against other authors.
The point is made by use of the potential market as a factor in
determining whether a use is fair. Since statutory copyright now
exists from the moment of creation, the potential-market factor
protects the work that has not been published against unfair
economic exploitation the same as if the work had been published.
That, of course, is the point of Harper& Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises."
While section 107 (fair use) is an obvious codification of the
accessibility principle in the form of a rule, section 10897 (library
use) is an unobvious weakening of the same principle. The right of
fair use makes a copyrighted work accessible during the copyrighted term, but section 108 is directed to the use of a work in a public
library and may well be one of two unconstitutional provisions of
the 1976 Copyright Act." This is because it defines (and thus
limits) the right of library patrons to use a copyrighted work owned
by the library. Since libraries exist to promote learning, an
extension of the copyright monopoly to inhibit the traditional use
of library materials flies directly in the face of the policy that
copyright should promote (not inhibit) learning. Section 108 thus
merits no discussion because the only appropriate comment to
make about it is that it should be held unconstitutional even
though it authorizes the use of section 107 to override it.
V.

UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT

Understanding copyright begins with an understanding of "the
exclusive Right." If the phrase means only the right to publish and

'The theory that an abridgment of a copyrighted work is not an invasion of literary
property is traced to a dictum expressed by Lord Hardwicke in 1740, when Sir Matthew
Hale's Pleas of the Crown was alleged to have been infringed." DRONE, supra note 9, at 435
(citing Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (1740)).
471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding fair use cannot be used to justify a scoop of an
unpublished manuscript or to avoid copyright infringement liability).
7 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
9 The other is 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1988), to the extent it authorizes the work-for-hire
doctrine.
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vend, copyright can be only a right-or series of rights-to which
a work is subject. If the phrase is taken to mean exclusive rights
arising from ownership of a work, copyright becomes a plenary
property right. Copyright, however, is so abstract an expression
that it is no more than "a prohibition of conduct remote from the
persons or tangibles of the party having the right" defined by
statute." Thus it wears the property label uneasily.
Because proprietary concepts are largely concepts of control in
the form of the property owner's right to exclude others from
enjoyment of the property, they are detrimental to the purpose of
copyright, the promotion of learning. This purpose explains why
the copyright owner is by statute limited to defined uses, the
copyrighted work is subject to use by others, and the copyright is
terminated at a time certain. The copyright that Congress can
grant is thus both more and less than a property right. The "more"
is a defined statutory monopoly; the "less" is the limitations
regulating that monopoly. The basis for understanding the nature
of copyright, then, is to know that it is primarily a regulatory
concept, for Congress can grant only the rights to publish and vend,
rights that the Constitution requires be subject to regulation in the
form of both conditions precedent and conditions subsequent.
That copyright is a conditional right means that it is not so much
a reward as it is a quid pro quo. The author receives the reward
for making his or her original work of authorship accessible to all.
Contrary to the common notion, the reward is not for the act of
creation, but for distribution to provide public access: public
learning comes not from the creation of a work, but from reading
and studying it, a truism that copyright owners have apparently
managed to hide from courts for many years. Thus, to allow the
author to retain the right-for life and beyond-to control access to
a publicly disseminated work is to grant him or her the power to
defeat the purpose of copyright even after having received its
reward.
This danger calls for a better understanding of copyright than
most courts have shown. Recall that without the statutory grant

- White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.
concurring) (holding copyrighted score only protects author from unauthorized copies ofsheet
music, not perforated rolls of music for a player piano).
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that is copyright, the author would not be entitled to an exclusive
right of publication. Therefore, even as it intrudes upon the public
domain, copyright must also protect it by ensuring accessibility
both for the cause of learning and in aid of creation by authors.
(Arguably, for example, without the public domain for literature,
O'Neill's Mourning Becomes Electra"° could be characterized as
a plagiaristic infringement of Aeschylus, to say nothing of many of
Shakespeare's plays in relation to Plutarch's Lives.)01° Copyright's role of protecting, even as it intrudes upon, the public
domain results in a statutory design that requires three elements:
the work, the copyright, and copies of the work.
Few courts, however, appreciate the relationship between these
elements, primarily because of the physical manifestation of
copyright, the copy of the work. Indeed-to turn back briefly to
copyright history-the stationers viewed copyright as the private
ownership of the actual "copie" or manuscript, which they somehow
° And when interpreting the Statute
obtained from the author.'O
of Anne, the House of Lords ruled that the initial copy (manuscript)
of any work is owned by the author.'13 Since the manuscript was
transformed into a printed copy protected by copyright (also owned
by the author), it followed logically to most people that the author
owned the work. Thus, according to William Blackstone, under
Roman law, "in works of genius and invention," when one painted
a picture on another man's canvas, the law gave the canvas to the
painter."' And in the language of the Supreme Court: "At
common law an author had a property in his manuscript, and
might have an action against anyone who undertook to publish it

100 EUGENE

O'NEILL, MOURNING BECOMES ELECTRA (1931).

101 PLUTARCH, LIvEs OF THIS NOBLE GRECIANS & ROMANS (Sir Thomas North trans.,

David Nutt 1895).
102 See, e.g., 2 EYRE & RIVINGTON, A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF WORSHIPFUL
COMPANY OF STATIONERS 1640-1708 A.D. 415 (Peter Smith ed., 1950) (1913) (concerning

Master John Starkey's claim to Paradiseregayn'd by John Milton); id. at 178 (concerning
Master Henry Hirringman's claim to Hamlet by William Shakespeare).
10 Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (KB. 1769) (recognizing a common-law copyright
in an author and referring to Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (A.L. 1774), which held
that an assignee of an author did not receive a perpetual common-law copyright).
104 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 406 (Bell's
American ed., 1771) (from twenty-sixth chapter, entitled "Title to Things Personal by
Occupancy').
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without authority."1 5 One reason the idea of the author's ownership of his or her work continues to persist, then, is that people still
tend to equate copyright with the physical manifestation of the
work in the form of a copy.
It is, of course, to the copyright owner's advantage to keep
copyright as concrete as possible, for the more concrete it appears
to be, the more proprietary copyright can be made to seem. And it
is as property that copyright justifies copyright owners in treating
the Copyright Act as a de facto grant of private lawmaking power
to enable them unilaterally to expand the copyright monopoly. For
example, the basis of the often-made claim of the right to receive
fifty cents per page for any copying must be the copyright owner's
absolute and exclusive right to copy any portion of a work, which
has no basis in the Copyright Act and indeed is refuted by section
107, the fair-use doctrine. (Significantly, it was not until the
photocopying machine presented the possibility "of gathering great
profits in small payments" l" that the absolute right to copy was
manufactured.) Given the sanctity accorded to the right to
contract, lower courts find it difficult to condemn the copyright
owners' usurpation of legislative power in the guise of private
contracts. 7 This is especially true when the courts-as they
generally do-view the copyright owners as protecting works they
own by reason of copyright. Therefore, it will be useful to dispose
of the myth that the author owns the work.
The work is an intangible creation of the mind and as such
cannot be owned by anyone. "It is the intellectual production of the
author which the copyright protects, and not the particular form
which such production ultimately takes ... ."0 And as an
intellectual creation, the work can exist only in the mind. As

106

Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909) (holding copyright

based
106 on recent application for registration of work cannot be sustained).

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917).
is almost surely why the Supreme Court has taken the unusual step of
constitutionalizing the right of others to use uncopyrightable material incorporated by
someone else in a copyrighted work. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991) (holding telephone directory white pages are uncopyrightable). The lower court's
107 This

rejection of a right that the framers of the Constitution intended from the beginning justified
Justice O'Connor's bold step and the unanimous concurrence of her fellow justices.
106

Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899) (holding copyright statute must be strictly

complied with to receive copyright protection).
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Congress recognized in the House Report on the 1976 Act, "[iut is
possible to have an 'original work of authorship' without having a
'copy'... embodying it .... ."o
The work thus necessarily stands apart from-and precedes-even its original copy. When reduced to a copy, the work
consists of words (or if a work of art or music, images and sounds)
borrowed from the public domain to give expression to public
domain ideas. The copyright relates only to that copy and is no
more than a statutorily created and limited right to regulate the
sale of additional copies. There are, then, only two entities in
copyright law that can be owned: the copy (a physical manifestation of the work) and the copyright (the right to reproduce the work
in copies). The author owns both the first copy (or manuscript) and
the copyright; the purchasers of copies own their individual copies.
Under the Copyright Act no one can own the work any more than
one can own ideas.
While in theory the law could recognize ownership of the work,
to do so would be like giving legal titlteto daydreams. The
ownership of an intellectual creation means nothing until it is
reduced to a "copy," for without fixation, the creation fades as
surely as the daydream is shattered by an intruding voice. And
once the work is reduced to a copy, it is only the copy-as the
fixation of an original work of authorship-that need be protected.
There is no need to recognize "ownership" of the work. Indeed,
there are dangers in doing so because ownership of the work would
entail ownership of its contents, including ideas. Copyright would
thus cease to be only a series of limited rights to which a given
work is subject for a limited time and would become, instead,
ownership of ideas, an ownership that the Copyright Act specifically and emphatically rejects in accordance with the limitations on
Congress's power found in the Copyright Clause."1
Even so, the notion of ownership of the work persists. Copyright
owners claim that as owners of the work they have a right to
control another's use of the work as well as the use of the copyright.

9
0"
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.

5659, 5666. The Report goes on to point out that it is also possible to have a copy that does
not manifest an original work of authorship.
110U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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The only explanation is the goal of obtaining control of the
secondary market for their works (they already have control of the
primary market) to enhance the profit potential for copyright.
Their goal, in short, is a statutory guarantee of profit.
While profit is not a four-letter word in terms of the free-market
system, it can be argued that a statutory guarantee of profit for an
author's writings is to be had only at great risk to the public
welfare. For once they have persuaded Congress to abuse the
public interest by extending the copyright monopoly for more profit,
copyright owners have no reason not to realize the fruits of their
efforts by charging monopolistic prices. Thus the statutory
guarantees of profit-for which copyright owners work so
hard--skew the constitutional scheme of copyright. However subtle
and however justified in terms of entitlement, guarantees of profit
reduce all learning to marketable commodities. And learning as
merely a marketable commodity will lead inevitably to coin-hungry
turnstiles in the now free lending libraries, a threat to the naturallaw right of learning that we can ill afford, as history tells us. For
learning as a commodity for the marketplace is a fair description
of the situation with the stationers' copyright, which was deemed
to consist of the writing itself in the form of the manuscript.
Ultimately, the concept of the ownership of writings does not
work because copyright can properly be viewed only as a three-part
concept which must serve the interest of three groups: authors,
entrepreneurs, and users. Each has a legitimate interest in
copyrighted works-authors in reputation and monetary gain,
entrepreneurs in profit, and users in learning. Each group thus
has a legitimate claim to consideration by the others because the
goals are interrelated, and the rights leading to those goals must
be kept in proportion.
One's conclusion as to the nature of copyright is determined by
one's view of its source. A coherent and consistent view of copyright requires that the source be Congress, which can grant the
author only the right to publish and vend, with only such extensions as do not subordinate constitutional policies to the cause of
private profit. The point is that copyright law is more regulatory
than proprietary in nature, for only the regulatory concept makes
any sense in view of the three policies that the Copyright Clause
mandates: promotion of learning, protection of the public domain,
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and benefit to the author.
VI. CONCLUSION

The expansion of copyright law to accommodate new developments over the two centuries since the 1790 Act has caused an
erosion of constitutional policies to the extent that the contemporary challenge in copyright law is how best to secure the protection
these policies were intended to provide. Two steps may be useful.
One is for courts to recognize that they revive the stationers'
copyright when they create judicial copyrights. This is because the
judicial copyright is subject to no limitations other than those that
may be in the court order, seldom framed with either the Copyright
Clause or the limitations of the Copyright Act in mind. The
judicial copyright thus becomes a device of monopoly beyond its
constitutional bounds and an instrument of censorship contrary to
the free-speech values contained in the Copyright Clause.
The second step is to recognize that copyright entrepreneurs are
asserting their limited rights "in absolute terms to the exclusion of
all else"' as a part of their campaign to create what is tantamount to a black market consisting of unlawfully claimed copyright
rights."' They are following in the tradition of the English
booksellers in their claims for the authors' perpetual common-law
copyright. History is thus repeating itself, and the early judicial
success of copyrightists in this century parallels the early judicial
success of the booksellers in the eighteenth century. The extension
of copyright to the products of new technology has provided an
occasion to revive the proprietary idea that justified its creation for
new technology-the printing press-in the first place.
If history continues its repetitive cycle, courts will eventually
recognize the consequences of the black-market rights of copyright-an unregulated monopoly and private censorship-and will
act accordingly. The remedy, however, will come much sooner if
judges recognize that the Copyright Clause gives Congress the

1..

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 432 n. 13 (1984).

" For an example of the extreme claims of copyright owners, see Appendix A, the copy
of a letter from the Association of American Publishers Copyright Compliance Office to a

copyshop owner.
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power only to grant the exclusive right to publish and vend for a
limited period of time and interpret the Copyright Act in light of
those limitations.
The key to understanding "the exclusive Right" is the right to
vend, for the right to publish with no intent to sell copies raises the
issue of access. Copyright, in short, was designed to protect against
competitors. And its main fimction is to protect the entrepreneur
against those who would pirate a work for competitive sale in the
marketplace. The proprietary aspects of copyright thus should
extend not to the individual user who makes only a personal use of
the work. The opportunity for a few to gather "great profits in
small payments""' is not a proper basis for denying the constitutional rights of the many to use copyrighted works to further their
learning.
The framers limited copyright to the exclusive right to publish
and vend having made copyright subject to both conditions
precedent and subsequent as a means of further limiting the
copyright monopoly. The Constitution thus imposes duties on the
copyright owner that require him or her to validate the statutory
permission given to intrude upon the public domain for private
profit. We find those duties in copyright policies and principles.
They are an integral part of copyright law necessary to ensure that
copyright entrepreneurs do not change their temporary easement
into a fee-simple ownership of the public domain.

11

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917).
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VII. APPENDIX
March 1, 1993
Ms. Jean Belleman
Bel-Jean Copy/Print Center
7415 Baltimore Avenue
College Park, MD 20740
Dear Ms. Belleman:
The Association of American Publishers ("AAFP) has learned that your copy shop
has, without prior permission, made multiple copies of excerpts of copyrighted
works for distribution to students in course anthologies (or coursepacks, as they
are sometimes called). Specific instances of copying without permission are
detailed below:
An anthology for Professor Catherine A. Schuler's Theatre History course,
491, at the University of Maryland, College Park, spring semester 1993
96 pages (pages 387-490), from
The Complete Major Prose Plays of Henrik Ibsen
Translated by Rolf Fjelde
Excerpt: The Wild Duck"
Copyright 1978, Published by NAL/Dutton,
Permission neither sought nor received from publisher.
184 pages (pages 106-179, 251-309, 407-457), from
Signet Classic Book of 18th & 19th Century British Drama
Edited by: Katherine Rogers
Excerpt: "The Conscious Lover," by Richard Steele
Excerpt: "The London Merchant," by George Lillo
Excerpt: "Octoroon," by Boucicault
Copyright 1979, Published by NAL/Dutton
Permission requested January 27, 1993.
Permission granted on February 12, 1993.
Anthology purchased on February 3, 1993; and
An anthology for Professor Catherine A. Schuler's Honors course, 138-R,
at the University of Maryland, College Park, spring semester 1993
80 pages (pages 118-197), from
The Complete Maior Prose Plays of Henrik Ibsen
Translated by Rolf Fjelde
Excerpt: "A Doll's House"
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Copyright 1965, Published by NAIJDutton,
Permission neither sought nor received from publisher.
62 pages (pages 248-309), from
Signet Classic Book of 18th & 19th Century British Drama
Edited by: Katherine Rogers
Excerpt: "The London Merchant," by George Lillo
Copyright 1979, Published by NAL/Dutton
Permission requested February 1, 1993.
Permission granted on February 12, 1993.
Anthology purchased on February 3, 1993.
Carol Risher has approached you before regarding your copyright policies. (I
refer specifically to her March 9, 1992 letter to you.) At the time of that
correspondence, you represented to us that you had an understanding of copyright
and that you received permission prior to making copies. While we appreciate
that you seek permission in some instances, as evidenced above, it is imperative
that permission be both sought and obtained prior to each instance of copying
multipage excerpts of copyrighted material.
The copying of multipage excerpts from copyrighted works for sale or distribution to students without the permission of the copyright owner is an infringement
of copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 501. Such copying without permission subjects the
infringer to damages, injunctive relief, and the obligation to pay the copyright
owner's costs of suit (including legal fees).
I am writing on behalf of the AAP and of Penguin USA, whose copyrights were
infringed, to put you on notice of the legal standards with which you must comply;
to obtain your written agreement that you will comply with them, that is, that you
will refrain in the future conduct of your business from making such multiple
copies of excerpts of copyrighted materials as course materials without prior
permission; and to demand payment of $2,500, in exchange for a promise not to
engage in litigation in connection with this incident. The goal of the AAP and its
publisher members is not to discourage anthologizing -- to the contrary, publishers
grant permission for modest fees many thousands of times yearly. But we do seek
to discourage anthologizing without consent.
As you know, a recent AAP-sponsored lawsuit against the Kinko's copyshop
chain confirmed that, absent permission from the copyright holders, the copying
of excerpts from copyrighted works for compilation into course anthologies which
are then distributed to students infringes the copyright in the works excerpted.
Basic Books. Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
In that suit, which focussed (sic] on twelve instances of copying spread through
five separate course anthologies prepared at two Kinko's copyshops, the Court
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required Kinko's to pay damages of $510,000 -- $50,000 for each
of nine works copied, and $20,000 each for three additional
works (those from which Kinko's copied the fewest pages for the
smallest classes);
entered an injunction prohibiting Kinko's from making, without
permission, any anthology or coursepack that contains more than
one page from a copyrighted work;
compelled Kinko's to pay plaintiffs' legal fees, which were
ultimately set at $1,365,000.
The Court rejected Kinko's defense that the educational motive for which the
copying was undertaken, and the fact that professors asked for the copying in
connection with their classes, sufficed to render the anthologizing "fairuse" under
the copyright laws. It concluded that each of the twelve instances of anthologizing
challenged by the publishers -- ranging from as small as 14 pages of a 175-page
work to 110 pages of a 400-page work -- constituted copyright infringement.
Basic Books v. Kinko's did not change the law; to the contrary, it comported
with basic copyright principles. (Kinko's is not appealing.)
Those basic copyright principles have recently been confirmed in another
litigation brought against a copyshop engaged in unauthorized anthologizing. On
February 27, 1992, three publishers instituted an infringement action against a
Michigan copyshop, alleging that the copyshop was engaged in the unauthorized
anthologizing of copyrighted works for sale to students. The case is Princeton
University Press et al. v. Michigan Document Services. Inc. and James M. Smith
Civil Action No. 92-CV-71029-DT (BKH) (E.D. Mich.), in which the plaintiffs seek
statutory damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, as did the successful
plaintiffs in the Kinko's litigation.
We understand you are aware that on April 1, 1992, United States District
Court Judge Barbara Hackett issued a preliminary injunction from the bench
against the defendant copyshop and its owner-operator, stating that their
unauthorized anthologizing was a "clear misappropriation," and holding that
defendants were likely to be adjudged infringers at trial. Because of the
preliminary injunction, the copyshop may not copy or anthologize any of plaintiffs'
works without permission, under pain of contempt. This result reflects existing
principles of the copyright law, as did the Kinko's case.
Even before the decision, many copy centers had adopted policies requiring that
permission be obtained before copying multipage excerpts of copyrighted works for
distribution to students in course anthologies. These policies were adopted by both
on-campus, university-run shops and commercial copyshops. (A pamphlet
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detailing the basic requirements, published jointly by the National Association of
College Stores and the AAP, is enclosed.)
We call on you to agree, by your signature on both copies of the attached
agreement, to cease and desist from copying, without permission, multipage
excerpts of copyrighted works for sale to students. In addition, the scope of the
infringement identified above, committed in the face of the widely publicized
decision in Basic Books v. Kinko's warrants a payment of $2,500 to help defray
the costs of the AAP's copyright enforcement program in this matter and to
impress on your business the need to operate in compliance with controlling law.
Once the signed agreements are returned with your check, we will deliver, by
returning a copy fully executed by the AAP, a promise by the AAP on behalf of
itself and the publishers identified above not to undertake litigation by reason of
the excerpts referred to in this letter.
Should we not hear from you, we will take further action as appropriate,
including enhanced monitoring of anthologies at your facility for copyright
infringement, and the referral of this and/or other anthologies to counsel without
further notice to you. Absent your signed agreement and payment, the AAP and
the publishers will consider that you are subject to being sued for the copyright
infringements specified in this letter as well as other infringements in a suit
seeking a substantial recovery like that in the Kinko's case, without further
warning. (If you believe that there are circumstances establishing that there has
been no infringement, or that militate against the relief we are here seeking, let
me know promptly.)
The AAP and its publisher-members are committed to actively ensuring
compliance with copyright law.
Very truly yours,
Virginia Antos
Director of Copyright Compliance
Enclosures
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AGREEMENT
1. The Association of American Publishers (AAP") warrants that it is
authorized by Penguin USA ("the publishers" ) to promise Bel-Jean Copy/Print
Center ("the copyshop") that the publishers will not undertake litigation by reason
of the copying specified in the letter from Virginia Antos dated March 1, 1993.
The AAP and the publishers agree not to undertake such litigation, provided that
the copyshop returns a duly signed copy of this agreement and the payment
specified in paragraph 2 below immediately upon receipt of this letter.
2. The copyslop hereby agrees to cease and desist from creating, copying,
distributing, or selling, any anthology, compilation, collective work, course packet,
or similar collection containing multipage excerpts of copyrighted works for sale
to students as course materials without prior written permission of the copyright
holders or the duly authorized agent of the copyright holders of such excerpts, and
to pay to the AAP the sum of $2,500 to cover the costs of the AAP's copyright
enforcement program in this matter.
3. The copyshop also agrees to permit persons authorized by the AAP, as
evidenced by a letter from the AAP giving such authorization, to review and to
purchase at regular prices copies of any anthologies or coursepacks being held for
sale or distribution (or for copying for sale or distribution).
4. In addition to the AAP and the copyshop, this Agreement runs to the benefit
of, and may be enforced by, the publishers and all AAP members.
BEL-JEAN COPY/PRINT CENTER

By: Name:
Company:
Title:
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS

By: Virginia Antos
Director of Copyright Compliance
Date: March 1, 1993
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